On the Emergence of Life
This is a lengthy post. You can use this outline to quickly jump to any section of interest
- Introduction
- Emergence
- When speaking of emergence
- The utility of emergence
- Categories of emergence
- Examples of strong emergence
- Semiotics
- An initial synthesis
- The emergent wonder that is life
- The genetic machine is a strongly emergent construct
- The response of the evolutionist
- The requirements for becoming
- The strongly emergent requirements for information storage, transmission, and reception
- The strongly emergent requirement of energy
- The strongly emergent requirement of constraints
- The emergent organism
- Profound interdependencies
- Have we considered evolution, or only abiogenesis?
- In closing
For ages past, the simple and learned alike regarded life as a product of what Charles Darwin called the theory of creation. In 1859, Darwin noted that authors of the highest eminence seemed to be fully satisfied with the view that each species has been independently created. Darwin, though, asked whether another view might be a better explanation. He observed that living things vary, and often compete over scarce natural resources. He asked whether nature might not selectively preserve those variations best suited to winning that competition, such that life might instead have only been breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one. He contended that perhaps from so simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved. 1
Darwin’s idea was variably received. He ultimately published six editions of the Origin, each a revision in response to the comments and criticisms he had received. Whether life has evolved or not, we may at the very least say that Darwin’s idea has required modification. When he died in 1882, he still knew nothing of Gregor Mendel’s work on inheritance, and the structure of DNA would not be elucidated for some seventy years more. These required revision of Darwin’s original idea. The inheritance of traits, Mendel had determined, is not invariable, and some traits, though fairly inherited, are not outwardly expressed. In light of DNA, biological variability could not be attributed to the external conditions of life, nor to use and disuse, as Darwin had imagined. His long argument was thus reconceived as the neo-Darwinism of today, in which Darwin’s own natural selection is still upheld as an explanation for life’s diversity, but random, unintended genetic mutation is offered as the ultimate source of the variety from which nature may choose.
That is the tale of evolution writ small. Audacious in its beginnings, the theory now enjoys broad acceptance in many quarters. But that notwithstanding, we still may ask whether the idea is true. Here, we will contend that it is not. But before we say much more of it, let us review a few topics that will prove useful in our considerations.
Emergence
Emergence is a phenomenon commonly explained as a situation in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Obviously, whenever we consider anything made up of parts, there is a sense in which those parts are all we have. But in the case of emergence, we also have something additional that emerges when all the parts are present and assembled in the proper manner. An emergent property is not possessed by any of the parts individually, but only by their assembled whole. Sometimes, it is more accurate to speak of what emerges when parts are assembled as an emergent function or an emergent entity rather than an emergent property. But in any of these cases, we may broadly describe the thing we are considering as an emergent construct.
An emergent construct can be conceived of as two tiers: a lower, subsidiary tier containing the parts and a higher, emergent tier where the emergent whole is revealed and considered as a unified entity. As we have noted, this unified, emergent entity possesses some array of properties, or performs some array of functions, not possessed or performed by the subsidiary parts individually. Emergence is much easier to understand if we consider some concrete examples.
Color is an emergent property. Our perception of color results from those particular wavelengths of visible light that are absorbed or reflected by an object. Light itself is colorless, and in the absence of light, a substance or object has no color either. It is only when we observe light reflecting off an object that its color emerges.
Molecules are emergent entities. A water molecule is made of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Neither hydrogen nor oxygen has the properties of a water molecule individually. Those properties only emerge when the two are combined.
A brick wall is an emergent construct. An individual brick is not a wall, in the sense that it does not keep the wind, rain, or intruders out of a place. These are properties of a wall that only emerge when individual bricks are combined in a particular manner.
When speaking of emergence
We can see from the examples above that emergent phenomena always require the interaction of more than one subsidiary part. We may refer to these as a plurality of parts, and they must be brought together, or constrained, in some manner that facilitates their interaction. We can walk through these examples again to become more familiar with emergence and the ways we may speak of it.
In the case of color, there are two things that must be brought together: light and an object. Thus, we may say that light and the object occupy the subsidiary tier. We could also say that light and the object describe the subsidiary plurality. These two subsidiary parts must be constrained in the sense that light must shine on the object for its color to emerge. Here, we should note that subsidiary constraints may be both spatial, describing the physical relation of the parts to one another in space, and also temporal, describing the timing of their relationship. To observe color, it is not enough that light has shone on the object. We must look at the object while the light is shining. We can always explicitly state that the constraints on subsidiary parts are spatiotemporal ones, but in many cases we will simply speak of constraints with a tacit understanding of what is implied by that term.
In the case of a water molecule, two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom occupy the subsidiary tier. We should note that while a subsidiary plurality requires at least two parts, there are often more than two. These three atoms are constrained in the sense that they are joined together by chemical bonds to produce an emergent water molecule.
We may also note that water is a multi-tiered emergent construct. A water molecule is polar, an emergent property that is not possessed by hydrogen or oxygen atoms individually. But there are additional properties of water that only emerge when a plurality of water molecules is assembled. Examples include wetness and surface tension. So in the case of water, hydrogen and oxygen atoms occupy a subsidiary tier and a water molecule occupies an emergent tier. But water molecules, in turn, also serve as subsidiary parts that must be assembled — that is, constrained — to produce the emergent entity water, as we commonly conceive of it, at a still higher emergent tier.
In the case of a brick wall, the subsidiary tier simply includes some number of bricks. We might also say that mortar is a subsidiary part, if our wall includes mortar. In either case, these parts are constrained by their particular configuration: they are stacked in rows, and possibly mortared together, to form a wall. By virtue of this arrangement, the wall performs an emergent function that an individual brick, or even a disordered pile of bricks, does not.
Lastly, we should note that we often refer to an emergent property, function or entity in terms of the emergent tier alone. With effort, we may remain subsidiarily aware that the frog is only green because light is reflecting off of it, but in most cases we will simply say that the frog is green. We will simply speak of water, without specifically considering the hydrogen and oxygen atoms it is composed of, or the fact that a plurality of water molecules is necessary to observe many of the emergent properties of water. And we will speak of a brick wall as a unified entity, though in fact it is a collection of constrained subsidiary parts.
The utility of emergence
Much is gained when we explicitly acknowledge and consider the emergent dynamics of the world we inhabit. Virtually everything is made of parts, and in turn, many things serve as a subsidiary part of something else as well. When we wish to discover how some particular thing works, it is often useful to consider its individual parts in isolation. This approach may be described as methodological reductionism, and it has lead to many useful scientific insights — particularly in the case of molecular biology. But to the extent that such a reductionist approach overlooks emergent properties, functions and entities, broad understanding is diminished. Biochemist Erwin Chargaff has stated it well:
Consider a simple machine at rest: One may, by inspecting the parts and contemplating how they fit and work together, be able to explain the manner in which it produces motion, exerts force, or whatever. But only after seeing it do actual work will one begin to understand it. Only then shall we also recognize the source of the energy that it requires, be it steam, electricity, or another source, and be able to describe the fruits of its labor.2
Reductionism, in effect, focuses on mechanism while largely ignoring what must be put into a thing and what, in turn, is produced by it. In the case of emergent phenomena, we get more out than we have put in. And in most cases, this explains why the thing in question should be at all, and also why anything should be put into it. Reductionism answers how so effectively that why is often overlooked. An appreciation of emergence can help to remedy that tendency. And so we proceed.
Categories of emergence
Three broad categories of emergent phenomena can be described. These vary in terms of predictability and the manner in which the emergent quality is produced. Categories of emergence are usually characterized in terms of strength.
Weakly emergent properties are typically a consequence of the form of the subsidiary parts. The emergent function is not possessed by the subsidiary parts individually, but is a deterministic and invariable consequence of their constrained assembly. Any constrained plurality of the subsidiary parts is sufficient to produce the weakly emergent property. The emergent property is predictable if the nature of the subsidiary parts is known, but only after prior observation. Examples include the wetness of water or the color of gold.
An emergent property of intermediate strength may arise as a consequence of the form of the subsidiary parts as well as the particulars of their dynamic movement and interaction within constraints. Here, function may emerge in a formulaic, or law-like manner. The emergent property varies, but it is still predictable once the particulars of the subsidiary parts, their interactions, and their constraints are known. The emergent property is determined by these subsidiary particulars, but still no subsidiary part possesses the emergent property individually. Examples include properties like temperature, density and phase state, and also regularly ordered objects like snowflakes or crystals.
In these intermediate cases, the emergent property is not as entirely deterministic as it is in the case of weakly emergent ones, but still it is always calculable once the subsidiary particulars are known. An atom does not have a temperature. A collection of atoms need not have any particular temperature either, but the collection does have some certain temperature. And this emergent property, temperature, is a predictable result of the number of atoms present and the details of their constraints.
Strongly emergent constructs arise in a unique manner that is not generalizable or predictable from case to case. There is no formula, and unconstrained elements of the subsidiary tier are indeterminate with respect to the emergent function. Specific constraints are imposed on specific subsidiary parts to produce the emergent function. Because strong emergence is not generalizable or deterministic, it will be helpful to consider a few specific examples in more detail.
Examples of strong emergence
The American flag is a good example of a strongly emergent construct. The subsidiary parts are stripes of red and white, a blue field, and white stars. No one of these parts individually represents America. For them to do so, all the parts must be constrained in the specific pattern of the American flag. Of note, these subsidiary parts could be arranged in many other patterns, but then the emergent result would not be the American flag. Thus, we may say that no particular arrangement is subsidiarily required. For example, a red stripe could stretch across the blue field or run perpendicular to the white stripes. There is no subsidiary reason it should not. The required arrangement to produce the American flag is an emergent requirement. It is only necessary if that particular emergent meaning is required.
We may also note that the pattern of a strongly emergent construct is specific. We have already mentioned snowflakes and crystals as examples of intermediate emergence. These are certainly arranged in patterns, but their patterns are periodic, meaning they are formulaic and repetitive. Snowflakes, as an example, always have six points. Crystals grow into characteristically emergent shapes as determined by the constraining details of their formation. In contrast, the patterns of strongly emergent constructs are usually aperiodic. Alternatively, they may be repetitive, or contain some repetitious elements, but these are not subsidiarily required. The white stars on an American flag are arranged in rows on a blue field, but they could just as easily be placed over red stripes. The requirement that they be placed on the blue field is not a subsidiary requirement; it is an emergent one. The stars will still be stars if they are placed somewhere besides their usual location, but in that case the emergent result will not be the American flag.
Finally, we should note that strong emergence is the only variety of emergence that may be broken. Water is always wet. Temperature can always be calculated if other variables are known. But the subsidiary tier of a strongly emergent construct can be altered such that the emergent entity, property or function is lost irretrievably. We could reduce an American flag to unrecognizable bits of colored threads, and absent any awareness of its prior constraints, a person who had never seen the assembled flag would be unable to reconstruct it from the subsidiary parts.
An oil painting is another example of a strongly emergent construct. The subsidiary parts are a canvas and quantities of various colors of paint. The painting is the emergent whole. It is obvious that a canvas by itself is not a painting, but nor is the sum of all the paint employed to produce it. The painting only emerges when paint and canvas are constrained in a specific manner. The subsidiary parts are fairly described as “just paint and a canvas.” But the emergent painting is something more than that. This, of course is the fundamental dynamic of emergence to begin with: the whole is more than the sum of the parts. In the case of strong emergence, the specific parts that are included and the specific constraints that are imposed upon them allow this something more to emerge.
A language is a very prominent strongly emergent construct. In fact, a language requires multiple tiers of strongly emergent constructs.3 At each tier, constraints are imposed on indeterminacy at a lower tier to allow a higher tier of meaning to emerge. In the case of written English, there is a basement tier of utter indeterminacy: mere marks on a page, or perhaps scratches on a stone. Such random marks have no meaning, but when they are constrained into particular patterns, letters emerge. Letters, in turn, are indeterminate with respect to words. That is, we may not scrutinize the alphabet and so divine the dictionary. Rather, letters must be intentionally constrained into words, allowing a higher tier of vocabulary to emerge. Vocabulary, in turn, is constrained by rules of grammar, allowing us finally to use mere markings on a page, or scratches on a stone, to communicate using the emergent language in question.
Obviously, communication between two parties cannot commence until each is aware of the meanings assigned to the various words that comprise a vocabulary and the various rules that comprise a grammar. Put simply, both parties must be aware of what language is to be spoken. Both parties must also agree to speak this language. These concepts are the stuff of semiotics, so now we will turn our attentions there.
Semiotics
Semiotics is a field of study that considers the assignment of symbolic meaning. It is a superset of linguistics that encompasses both linguistic and non-linguistic sign systems. Semiotics and emergence are intimately linked. Virtually every object, action or concept that we can represent in any manner — any thing we may speak of, or even conceive of — is an emergent construct composed of subsidiary parts. We populate the subsidiary tier when we describe a thing, and acknowledge an emergent tier of unified function when we assign that thing a name. It is no longer “just bricks.” Now it is a wall. That is the way we speak of it, and also the way we conceive of it under normal circumstances. Every word is thus a symbol. The word itself is the symbol, and its definition is the referent — that object or concept the word symbolically represents.
A word is a strongly emergent construct in two senses. First, as a symbol alone, it is an emergent construct. In the case of a written word, the subsidiary parts are the letters that spell it, constrained by the particular order of letters required to produce the word. In the case of a spoken word, the subsidiary parts are sounds a mouth can make, and they must be similarly constrained into a specific pattern. As we have noted, these constraints are both spatial and temporal, determining the order in which we will consider the particular written letters or produce the particular sounds necessary to speak a word.
A word is an emergent construct, too, by virtue of its symbolic function. The subsidiary tier is occupied by the word’s definition, and the emergent tier is occupied by the word itself. Thus, we may use an emergent word (the only sort of word there is) to refer to a vast array of subsidiary parts without considering them individually. We may say, “I'm traveling to New York next week.” No one is likely to ask us which spot within New York we mean. We are referring to the entire city as an emergent construct, even though to go there we must indeed come to occupy some actual subsidiary spot within the city.
The hierarchically tiered, emergent constructs that comprise a language are very strong in character. Words and their definitions are definite, but also arbitrary. Neither may be inferred from the other; rather, all must be assigned. And such assignments must obviously be made by an external party. No object — whether a word, or any other sort of symbol — can assign itself a symbolic meaning. A meaningful symbol only holds a particular meaning for an external assigner of meaning, and for those parties who are informed of that assigned meaning and agree to it. Similarly, in itself no object is required to serve as a symbol. It must be made a symbol by an external assigner of meaning.
A traffic signal will not regulate traffic if drivers are not informed that red means stop and green means go. If traffic is to be regulated, the drivers must also agree to adhere to these assigned meanings. The traffic signal is a non-linguistic sign system in which colors are symbolically assigned to behaviors. Similarly, a linguistic sign system — that is, a language — may only be employed to communicate if there are speakers of the language who agree regarding syntax — those particulars of vocabulary and grammar that describe the language.
Because languages — and all sign systems — are strongly emergent constructs, we may speak of them as such. Thus, “radio” is not English, but is a subsidiary word in the English language. A grammatical rule stating that a sentence may not end with a comma is not English, but is a subsidiary rule for the English language. There is no inherent reason why “radio” should be a word; it is a word only because it has been made one. There is no inherent reason why a period may end a sentence in English, but a comma may not. It is only a rule because it has been made one. If English were not a language, “radio” would not be an English word, and a period would simply be a dot signifying nothing. In the case of non-linguistic sign systems, similar subsidiary commitments must be made regarding symbolic assignments and protocols for the transmission of meaning. Here too, for communication to occur, there must be agreement regarding these assignments and protocols. And in this latter, non-linguistic case, the resulting emergent construct may be fairly compared to a language, but is more accurately described as a code.
An initial synthesis
We have already made use of the arbitrary sort of assignment of meaning we have been describing. We have called a particular variety of emergence strong. But what is actually strong about it? Why not describe the varieties of emergence as light vs. heavy, or dim vs. bright? As we have stated, weak and strong have been the traditional terms used. That is to say, these are the terms that have been assigned by others who have previously considered emergence, and thus we have made use of the same terms in our considerations here.
What real distinction is being made when we stratify varieties of emergence? What quality does a strongly emergent construct possess that a weakly emergent construct does not? In fact, it is the quality of assignation. In the case of a weakly emergent property — say, the wetness of water — we have elected to call it wetness. But we have not decided that water should be wet. We have only decided that this is the label we will assign to that property. Water will be wet whether we call it wetness or not. We need not even call it water; we only choose to. We do this so that other speakers of English will understand what we mean when we speak of it.
In the case of a strongly emergent, meaning-bearing construct, we choose both the symbol and the meaning. Neither need serve as either, except as a result of our assignation. In the case of a painting, the painter may paint a landscape, or a portrait, or anything she chooses. She is also free to choose which colors are included in the image. A painting need not contain any red tones or any blue ones, or even be painted upon a canvas; that is all left to the discretion of the artist. In the case of language, the same holds true. We may assign meaning to a word — say, the word long. The meaning we assign is both arbitrary and definite. But importantly, we have also elected that long should be a word at all. Both the symbol and the referent are assigned electively. Neither quality is inherent or required.
It is for this reason that a strongly emergent construct requires subsidiary indeterminacy with respect to the emergent property. A strongly emergent property is, in fact, a purposefully assigned and deliberately elicited property, and here subsidiary indeterminacy is specifically a lack of such purposeful assignation. The property that is initially undetermined subsidiarily is the meaning or function that the individual part will have with respect to the emergent whole once suitable subsidiary constraints are imposed.
We might ask a man, “What soccer position do you play?” If he answers, “I don’t play soccer,” we may not logically proceed to ask again, “Yes, but what position do you play?” In the absence of membership on a soccer team, the question is nonsensical. With respect to the strongly emergent construct of a soccer team, a person does not play any position if they are not on a team. Absent the constraints of a team, their soccer position is undetermined. It is a strongly emergent construct because there is no particular reason that soccer should be a sport at all, or have the rules that it has, or that any particular team should exist, or that any particular person should be on a team or play any particular position. When a man does play a position — say, the goalie — and is on a team that exists, and abides by the rules of soccer, and plays against other soccer teams in accordance with those rules, this is all only because soccer, as a sport, has already been defined as an overarching, strongly emergent construct that requires all of these tiered subsidiary constructs to achieve its emergent purpose. At each successive tier, constraints are imposed to allow a higher organizational tier to emerge. When we speak of enjoying soccer, we generally refer to all of this as an emergent whole.
We find, then, a logical intersection of emergence and semiotics. We may continue to refer to strong emergence as strong for continuity’s sake. But strong emergence is actually distinguished by elective assignation. In general, this is an assignation of function to an emergent entity, achieved via the imposition of elective constraints upon those specific subsidiary parts necessary to elicit that function. In the specific case of a sign system, symbolic meaning is the function so elicited. There is an elective assignation of meaning to a symbol, along with the elective employment of the symbol itself. Such election is necessarily imposed from without. Broadly speaking, a strongly emergent function is not subsidiarily required of the parts; it is deliberately elicited from them via the specifics of the subsidiary constraints. In the specific case of symbolic meaning, no symbol is inherently a symbol; it is made one via the elective assignment of a subsidiary referent. The entity that assigns such meaning must occupy a tier external to both the subsidiary tier and the emergent tier alike. We may describe this tier of assignation as a still higher transcendent one.
The transcendent tier of assignation
What manner of entity may occupy this transcendent tier? In the case of an American flag, the subsidiary tier is occupied by its various parts, as we have noted. The flag is the emergent symbol that occupies the emergent tier. But a flag does not — and cannot — decide for itself what subsidiary parts it will include and what constraints they will have. An inanimate object cannot decide anything, or assign any meaning to itself or anything else. Decision is an act of will, and meaning may only be assigned or apprehended by a conscious mind. The American flag was conceived of by just such a mind, and designated as such by a deliberate act of will. History informs us that the mind of Betsy Ross was responsible, but we need not know that detail to know that some mind was responsible. Otherwise, America would have no flag.
We have spoken of the American flag as a strongly emergent, tangible symbol, and recognized that its assignation as such must be made by a transcendent mind. But to serve as a symbol, the flag must also be assigned to some referent. That is, a symbol must be made to represent some entity. In the case of the American flag, this referent is a nation: the United States of America. In this case, too, the assignation could never be made by the flag itself. It is, after all, only colored fabric. And in truth, it is not even necessarily that. The American flag could just as easily be painted on a wall, represented as pixels on a display, or even fashioned out of colored stones. The flag is an idea, whose meaning may only be apprehended by a mind and could only ever have been assigned by one. The same must necessarily be true of any strongly emergent construct that entails the assignment of symbolic meaning.
We additionally note that symbolic meaning, having been so assigned, may be enshrined via instantiation in an external construct. Such a construct must itself be strongly emergent, for reasons we shall presently review, but it need not be conscious, nor even animated. Any tangible display of an American flag in any medium represents such an instantiation. A book with pictures of flags and descriptions of the nations each represents is another helpful example. The book, itself, is a strongly emergent construct consisting of many subsidiary words and images. It does not know anything about flags or nations, of course. It did not decide what any flag should look like, or what nation any flag should represent. Such assignations must obviously be made by conscious minds as acts of will. Only then can they be documented in a book. And that book, in turn, may only communicate these assignments to those who speak the language in which the book is written.
A book certainly cannot invent a language. If it did, who could read it? Like any strongly emergent, meaning-bearing construct, a language must be created as a series of willful assignments by conscious minds. It may only then be enshrined in a mindless construct like a book. The meaningfulness of a book is entirely predicated upon these prior, willful assignments, for they are necessarily utilized to write the book.
This dependency is further illustrated if we imagine a bag full of letter tiles. If we happen to spill some tiles on the floor and they land in an arrangement that spells out “HAPPY BIRTHDAY” we will be quite amused; and even more so if it happens to be our birthday. But we will not be especially amused if the spilled letters read “HLXTP FSTRGLTU.” In that case we would simply collect our spilled letter tiles without further comment. “HAPPY BIRTHDAY” is not meaningful because spilled letter tiles randomly produced it. It is rather the opposite: these patterns of letters carry meaning because they are already words. Their relevance is not a consequence of spilled letter tiles; it is a consequence of the emergent English language, of which both “HAPPY” and “BIRTHDAY” are already subsidiary parts, as determined and mutually agreed upon by transcendent speakers of the language.
With regard to the assignment of meaning, this dynamic is not sometimes the case; it is always the case. No thing may ever be said to have any meaning, purpose, or function in the absence of a contextualizing, strongly emergent construct. These particular qualities may only ever be possessed by a thing, in any sense, with respect to other adjacent things. Collectively, all these gathered things describe a subsidiary plurality, and they must be sufficiently and appropriately constrained from a transcendent perspective if any meaning, purpose or function is ever to emerge from their assembly. A thing may only have a meaning if it is assigned one by an external mind, and it will only mean that to the assigning mind and those other minds that are aware of and agree with the assignation. A thing may only be said to have a purpose in the context of some broader, emergent entity of which it is but a part, having been deliberately included in an aptly constrained plurality. And a thing may only be said to have a function when it has some effectual and intentional relationship with other adjacent things, to produce some desired emergent outcome distinct from that produced by any subsidiary parts.
Having considered all of this in preparation, let us turn our attention to what is easily the most extraordinary emergent construct on Earth: life.
The emergent wonder that is life
What is life? It is easy to propose answers that are too sentimental and vague on the one hand, or else too sterile and formulaic on the other. Let us begin with a simple observation: Life moves with purpose.
Of course, dead things move too. The wind may always stir up a bit of dust. But the movement of life is more than that. Living things move for a reason. Even a humble plant does more than spread like a puddle; it grows toward the light. And animals, of course, do far more. They move bodily toward what they desire, and away from what threatens them. If the need is urgent, they even run. Life seeks what is needed and shuns what is noxious. The source of these motivations has been a matter of some debate, and presently it is likely to remain so, but the outworkings of them are seen plainly enough.
Life has an inner movement too, and paradoxically the director of these dynamic processes is less difficult to name. That has not always been the case, but today we live in an age of relative enlightenment regarding the matter. In many domains, the inner, molecular machinations of life have been substantially unraveled. There is doubtlessly more to be discovered than has even been understood so far; but still, we live in an era of unprecedented biological insight. Today, we speak glibly of much that lay hidden and inaccessible for most of history. Having discovered so much about ourselves, we should surely devote some time to consider a portion of it. And hopefully, we can still regard life with not too jaded an eye. Life’s subsidiary tier, we now know, is full of molecules set in motion; but their assembled, emergent splendor should still elicit from us at least a little wonder.
Generational inheritance
Life, we have long recognized, becomes itself and maintains itself. And ultimately, life reproduces itself. Certainly, some living things do not ever reproduce. But even so, every living thing on earth today is at the very least a product of reproduction, and closely resembles the organism or organisms that so produced it. The mechanism for heredity — this transmission of biological information from one generation to the next — has not always been well understood. Our twentieth century remedied that.
In 1944, physician Oswald Avery and his co-workers published evidence suggesting that DNA molecules, rather than proteins, might be the molecular agents of inheritance.4 In 1950, biochemist Erwin Chargaff noted that the nucleobase content of DNA molecules varies from species to species, further supporting the notion that the molecule might be aperiodic, and thus capable of storing genetic information.5 In 1952, geneticists Alfred Hershey and Martha Chase performed experiments to further the work of Avery,6 and in 1953 James Watson and Francis Crick elucidated the aperiodic, double-helix structure of DNA.7
Having identified DNA as the storehouse of hereditary information, a discrepancy became apparent. The central role of protein enzymes in cellular function had already been noted, and proteins were known to be composed of twenty different amino acids in varying sequences.8 DNA, however, is composed of only four nucleobases. A 1:1 correspondence between nucleobases and amino acids would be insufficient for the transmission of heritable biological information, allowing four amino acids to be specified at the most. A 2:1 correspondence could specify up to sixteen amino acids, also insufficient. A 3:1 correspondence could signify up to sixty-four amino acids, and this would be more than enough.
This is the precise line of reasoning that lead physicist George Gamow to propose that triplets of nucleobases in DNA could serve to specify the twenty amino acids in proteins.9 In the 1960’s, numerous researchers confirmed this as fact, and deciphered the details of the assignments of nucleobase triplets, or codons, to amino acids. In 1968, Holley, Khorana and Nirenberg jointly received the Nobel Prize for their interpretation of the genetic code and its function in protein synthesis.10
The genetic code is not merely a code in a figurative sense. It is an actual code — an organized, highly non-random sign system that is necessary for the four nucleobases that comprise DNA to specify the twenty amino acids that make up proteins.11 The genetic code describes the core of a particular, strongly emergent construct that is utilized by all living things to great effect, allowing them to become themselves and to reproduce themselves. We may refer to this massive, strongly emergent construct as the genetic machine.
The genetic machine
The genetic machine functions as an emergent, unified entity to effect gene expression, by which an encoded segment of DNA — a gene — is deciphered to produce a required RNA or protein molecule. The genetic machine’s subsidiary tier contains many thousands of RNA and protein molecules that are produced by the machine itself, when required, to effect gene expression. These subsidiary molecules serve no purpose — nor even exist in a relevant context — apart from the emergent function of the genetic machine. They certainly do not individually accomplish gene expression; in fact, they are products of gene expression. They are built to order within an organism at a particular place and time, and in accordance with genes that direct for their assembly. They are only so assembled when they are required for gene expression or some other cellular function that supports gene expression.
The function of the machine in brief
Many thousands of pages could be written describing the function of the genetic machine in great detail, and many have been. It is composed of a great many subsidiary parts, and each could be separately considered. But for our purposes, we will stroll quickly down the path of gene expression to point out some highlights along the way. We will mention several particular structures, and a reader so inclined may easily dive deeper into any of these topics. But we will not explain much in detail here. Our goal is only to survey this immensely complex machinery that allows life to be, and note the many multi-tiered, strongly emergent constructs of which it is comprised.
Subsidiary molecules of the genetic machine include protein enzymes that are serially expressed in a tightly regulated manner to describe biosynthetic pathways. These serve to assemble molecules like the nucleotide monomers of DNA and RNA and the amino acid monomers of proteins step by step. Many of the intermediate compounds produced during such biosynthesis serve no individual purpose for the cell. They are merely steps along the path to the assembly of a needed molecule. Some intermediate compounds degrade within seconds if biosynthesis does not proceed.
Initiation of gene transcription is not fully understood, but it is an undeniably emergent process. In the case of eukaryotes, over 100 subsidiary proteins must assemble to initiate transcription of a single gene, and the order of their assembly differs from gene to gene. Other subsidiary components include topoisomerases to unwrap and stabilize DNA while it is being transcribed. If a DNA molecule becomes supercoiled, topoisomerases serve to sever the molecule, allow it to relax, and then join it back together. Polymerase molecules proceed to do the actual transcribing. Polymerases, too, are strongly emergent constructs composed of numerous protein subunits that assume an emergent quaternary structure to effect polymerization and build an mRNA transcript of a DNA gene.
The spliceosome is yet another strongly emergent construct composed of five subsidiary RNA molecules and several hundred protein molecules. As an assembled whole these function as an emergent nano-machine, the spliceosome, to excise intron segments from the mRNA transcript, check meticulously and repeatedly for splicing errors, and splice the remaining exon segments back together. Local or distant intronic or exonic DNA control structures may direct the spliceosome to splice exon segments together in multiple variant combinations to allow one gene to express thousands of different proteins as required by the organism.
If the mRNA transcript is found to have spliced incorrectly and contain incorrect stop codons, it is eliminated via nonsense-mediated mRNA decay. This is accomplished by the exosome, another strongly emergent construct consisting of nine core proteins, two associated proteins, and numerous regulatory proteins. Otherwise, the edited mRNA transcript is transported from the cell’s nucleus to the cytoplasm of the cell. It exits through one of some thousand nuclear pores that stud the nuclear envelope. Functionally, a nuclear pore could be conceived of as “a little hole” that lets mRNA out of the nucleus. But in fact, each nuclear pore is a strongly emergent construct composed of nearly 500 subsidiary protein molecules that allow it to recognize and export appropriate macromolecules at the appropriate time. Molecules are recognized as appropriate because they have been tagged with a guanine nucleotide-binding protein — itself an emergent construct composed of subsidiary subunits that must bind with one another, then bind with an exportin protein to be activated, and additionally bind to the mRNA transcript itself.
Once the mRNA transcript has left the nucleus, it is transported to a specific location within the cell if needed. This transport is effected by motor proteins like kinesins and dyneins — each, as we might now expect, a strongly emergent construct composed of multiple subsidiary protein molecules that together allow these motor proteins to bind to the mRNA transcript and walk, in either a hand-over-hand or inchworm manner, along a microtubule to the specified intracellular location. Dynein only walks in this manner when activated by dynactin, another strongly emergent construct composed of twenty-three subsidiary proteins that together effect the emergent purpose of activating an appropriate dynein molecule. The microtubules along which these proteins walk are also strongly emergent constructs formed via polymerization of two globular proteins to form protofilaments, which then assume a tubular structure organized around a microtubule organizing center, or MTOC. The MTOC, too, is an emergent construct composed of two cylindrical proteins surrounded by an amorphous cloud of proteinaceous pericentriolar material. These follow a tightly regulated cycle that is synchronized with the cycle of cell-division.
When the mRNA transcript reaches its intracellular destination, protein synthesis can actually begin. Ribosomes there utilize the transcript to assemble a new protein one amino acid at the time, but this is only possible because numerous ribosomes have already been synthesized. A typical mammalian cell contains about ten million ribosomes.
Each ribosome is a strongly emergent construct comprised of 50-80 subsidiary protein and ribosomal rRNA molecules. The ribosome is meticulously synthesized within the nucleolus via an elaborate process. A large ribonucleoprotein is assembled there from numerous subsidiary rRNA molecules as well as ribosomal protein components that were synthesized in the cytosol by pre-existent ribosomes and then transported back into the nucleolus to bind with the rRNA molecules. Small nucleolar RNA molecules, or snoRNAs, also bind with proteins there to produce small nucleolar ribonucleoproteins that make several hundred specific modifications to individual nucleobases within rRNA molecules. By this process, immature forms of the ribosome’s two subunits are assembled. These are then transported to the cytosol via a nuclear pore complex, and only there do they finally assume their mature, emergent form and begin to synthesize proteins. Even then, the ribosome always functions in a strongly emergent manner. Its large and small subunits only join together when actively synthesizing a protein.
The ribosomal subunits assemble around the mRNA transcript and recognize a particular non-coding sequence on it. The position of this sequence determines the location of the first three-base codon in the coding sequence. The ribosome undergoes a change in its shape in response to the codon to effect conformational proofreading, preferentially facilitating entry of a transfer RNA, or tRNA molecule with an anticodon segment that specifically corresponds to the mRNA codon. The tRNA molecule brings a cognate amino acid into the ribosome along with it. The tRNA molecule has already been charged — or aminoacylated — with its amino acid by a separate protein molecule called an aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase, or aaRs. The aaRs recognizes the tRNA’s acceptor stem, anticodon, and other identity elements within the tRNA molecule and charges the tRNA with the appropriate amino acid. Each aaRs molecule has a domain that recognizes a particular amino acid with super-specificity.12 Most aaRs molecules engage in subsequent, secondary proofreading of a bound amino acid to ensure it is the correct one. The aaRs then charges the cognate tRNA with the appropriate amino acid. A correctly charged tRNA molecule, in conjunction with its cognate amino acid residue, assumes a particular conformation that is recognized by elongation factor, or EF, an additional protein. EF binds to the tRNA and its cognate amino acid to form another strongly emergent construct — a ternary structure — that facilitates entry into the ribosome. The ribosome further alters its own conformation to assess whether the ternary tRNA-aaRs-EF complex indeed matches the current codon in the mRNA transcript. If it does, a GTP molecule separately bound to EF is hydrolyzed, and only then does EF alter its conformation to release the other two molecules and allow the new amino acid to be added to the new protein molecule being synthesized.
This synthetic process continues until a stop codon is encountered in the mRNA transcript. Alternatively, if several sequential amino acids are erroneously incorporated into the new protein, this can also trigger cessation of protein synthesis and degradation of the new, incorrectly formed protein. In either case, a separate protein release factor recognizes either the stop codon or the string of erroneous amino acids. The new polypeptide is detached from the ribosome. If it has been translated accurately, it is taken elsewhere to be folded with the assistance of protein chaperones. If inaccurately, it will be degraded via the ubiquitin-proteasome complex or a lysosome. Each of these means of intracellular protein degradation represents a strongly emergent construct as well.
As we have noted, each topic we have briefly touched on here could be described in far more detail, but we have said well enough to prove our point. The genetic machine is a massive, strongly emergent construct composed of countless subsidiarily emergent constructs in tiered hierarchies. We may consider each facet in minute detail, or alternatively sum the function of the whole business up as gene expression, by which a gene is read and a protein or RNA molecule is assembled. As we have noted, this is the case with any strongly emergent construct. We may delve into the particulars, or we may simply refer to the whole by its name. For our purposes, from here forward we will generally speak of it all as the genetic machine.
The genetic machine is a strongly emergent construct
The emergent function of the genetic machine is so singular that even a child can easily understand it:
A gene directs the building of a protein.
With this simple statement, a great mystery of the ages is summarily answered. But should we dare to peek beneath the hood, we find an unimaginably dense hierarchy of interwoven subsidiary parts, nearly all of which are emergent constructs themselves. The collected mechanisms of the genetic machine are so vast and so elaborate that it is virtually impossible for us to conceive of it subsidiarily. There is simply too much.
With this, we have not made a particularly new observation. The legendary biophysicist Carl Woese said much the same shortly after the genetic code was deciphered:
The translation apparatus is extremely complex; the complexity is evident not only in the number and kinds of parts which the apparatus contains, and in their inter-relationships, but also in the behaviour of the machine as a whole under various perturbations. The behaviour of the cell's translation apparatus…certainly places this machine in the class of complex machines. 13
Yes, the genetic machine is complex indeed. But we are not here concerned with its complexity so much as the emergent nature of that complexity. It is the behavior of the machine as a whole that is most striking. And without question, this behavior is emergent. There is no subsidiary part of the genetic machine that could ever accomplish gene expression individually. It is a task that only an emergent construct can perform, for reasons we will presently review.
The genetic machine arises, as all strongly emergent constructs must, from a basement tier of indeterminacy. Its granular parts are mere molecules — the nucleotides that make up DNA and RNA and the amino acids that make up proteins. Even these, of course, emerge from the atoms of which they are composed. But they do not do so randomly. They are assembled to specification in service of the genetic machine’s emergent purpose. We know they are for the machine because they are made by the machine. Individual nucleobases and amino acids do nothing and accomplish nothing; they are synthesized only to serve as subsidiary parts. Thus, the genetic machine manufactures its own tier of indeterminacy.
The evidence of prior assignation and agreement
Where is the genetic code recorded? Where are its conventions defined? We can name no molecule that individually serves either purpose. There is no single molecule that assigns the codon AAA to the amino acid lysine. There is no single molecule that specifies that a codon should always be three nucleobases in length. If we regard DNA itself, it is not observably divided into codons, nor introns and exons, nor even into genes. It is simply a long sequence of nucleobases. Just as Chargaff observed, it is only after seeing the genetic machine do actual work that may we begin to understand it. And this is because the symbolic assignments and conventions of the genetic code are utterly emergent.
When we purchase a new novel at the bookstore, a dictionary and grammar are not included in the front matter. The author does not rehearse these many subsidiary assignments of meaning and protocol for us; she assumes that we know them already. It is a reasonable assumption, because our comprehension of the book depends upon knowing all of that. Obviously, we must speak the language in which the book is written to make use of it, even as the author has made use of that language to write it. We know that a book is not mere gibberish if there are any who can read its contents and demonstrate their meaning.
We find an entirely analogous situation in the case of the genetic machine. The codon to amino acid assignments that comprise the genetic code are not written down in any molecule, nor even in any isolated group of molecules. We cannot learn the code by studying any particular tRNA molecule, nor even by considering all of them. The same may be said of aminoacyltransferases (another name for the aaRs molecules previously described), and of every subsidiary component of the genetic machine. The machine does not document the assignments and conventions of the genetic code; it simply makes use of them. These symbolic assignments and conventions are decidedly real. If they were not, the genetic machine could not function. But they are discernible only from an emergent perspective. If we consider the parts individually, there is simply no code to be found. After all, subsidiarily they are just molecules.
We have observed that symbolic meaning must always be assigned from without, and that the meaning so assigned is henceforth known only to the assigner and any parties made aware of the assignment. There must be agreement as to the meaning. This, as we have seen, is how we know the contents of a book are meaningful: there must be at least one who can read it. In the case of the genetic machine, where is this agreement observed? The answer is quite extraordinary: the genetic machine agrees with itself. We may decipher the assignments and conventions of the genetic code through careful observation of the genetic machine’s emergent function, as brilliant scientists have actually done. But when particular genes are expressed in accordance with these assignments and conventions, we find that their products are the subsidiary components of the genetic machine itself. The agents of gene expression are thus products of gene expression. They exist, simultaneously, as a result of the code and also as its only material instantiation.
Such an arrangement requires assignation from a transcendent tier. A molecule cannot decide to mean something, and in the absence of an emergent whole, no molecule does mean anything. Symbolic meaning cannot be happened upon subsidiarily, because meaning is not an incremental property; it is an emergent one. It must begin as an idea. Meaning may only then be assigned from a transcendent perspective that imposes sufficient subsidiary constraints to elicit that meaning. It must be assigned by a mind, as an act of will.
IIn the case of life, who is this transcendent assigner of meaning? Science cannot say. But the genetic code did not write itself. No code can. A symbol cannot assign itself a meaning.
Eugene Koonin has described the origin and subsequent evolution of the genetic code as an extremely and unusually hard problem, forbiddingly difficult, and one of the most fundamental and hardest problems in all of biology.14 He has said:
It seems that the two-pronged fundamental question: “Why is the genetic code the way it is and how did it come to be?”, that was asked over 50 years ago, at the dawn of molecular biology, might remain pertinent even in another 50 years.15
We will contend that Koonin, despite his admirable candor, has still understated the difficulty. As a modern biologist writing for his peers, he surely knew his audience would bristle at the word impossible. But we must bear in mind that there is nothing especially impossible about a symbol; we encounter them every day, and even produce new ones.
It is only impossible for evolution to produce one.
The response of the evolutionist
The evolutionist, of course, will roundly disagree with our conclusions. None of that is true, they will insist. It began as something simpler and evolved. And why is this an unsatisfactory explanation? Because to hold this position, the evolutionist must ignore the strongly emergent nature of life.
There is always a sense in which a strongly emergent construct begins as something simpler. As we have noted, it must arise from indeterminacy. But life does not arise from indeterminacy invariably, or automatically. That would reduce life to a weakly emergent property, and this is clearly not the case. The matter is settled concretely with a simple observation: a living thing may die.
The emergent construct of life is eminently breakable. We cannot break the wetness of water. We cannot break the greenness of green. But the life of a living thing may be taken away. The subsidiary parts and constraints that have produced life may be altered or distorted such that death is the prompt and permanent consequence. Furthermore, it is clear that no subsidiary part of a living thing is itself alive apart from the emergent whole. From these facts, we may conclude that life is indeed emergent, and strongly so.
In light of this, we may identify the first flaw in the evolutionist’s claim. It began as something simpler, they will say. But this denies the emergent nature of function, and most particularly the function of meaning. The beginning of any strongly emergent construct is a basement tier of indeterminacy, and from this perspective, the emergent goal is imperceptible. A subsidiary thing cannot systematically approach an emergent goal that it cannot see. It may occasionally stumble in that direction by happenstance, but in the absence of a defined emergent construct, the subsidiary is no more determined now than it was before. To one who does not speak English, “HAPPY BIRTHDAY” means no more than “FXLTRPV.”
But it doesn't need a goal, our evolutionist will continue. It isn't trying to become anything. And in this, they are correct. For what does a molecule need? What should a molecule be? In the absence of an emergent construct, every subsidiary variation is equally meaningless. There is no basis for any pattern to be preferred. Subsidiary indeterminacy does not obtain a meaning for itself; meaning only ever emerges via transcendent assignation. From the veiled perspective of the subsidiary, dead is as good as alive. And dead is a quality substantially easier to maintain.
There is another difficulty in our evolutionist’s claim. To say, it began as something simpler is to say there is an it that began and is something. If a thing is merely to be, then being anything will always suffice. But if a thing is to become, it must first be something. And it is no simple matter to be something that is capable of becoming. Let us consider why that is so.
The requirements for becoming
If we consider any living thing, we will find that it has become itself. The man who stands before us today was once a little boy, and before that, ultimately a single cell. Today's mighty oak is yesterday's sapling, and once it was but an acorn. In every case, a living thing has become what it is. But importantly, there is an essential sense in which it is always the same distinct individual.
Through the course of development, much is added to the subsidiary tier in a quantitative sense. A human being begins as a single cell, but is ultimately composed of some thirty trillion cells. Each of these cells, in turn, is composed of trillions of molecules that once were parts of something other than the individual in question. Still, we do not regard a man as a different person from the boy he was. To the contrary, we regard him as the same person. To this end, we even call him by a name.
This dynamic is familiar enough. The man is a strongly emergent construct. His subsidiary parts increase in number during his development. But importantly, they do not increase qualitatively. The many parts he will ultimately be made of are all present, conceptually, at the start. By his maturation, that ultimate organization is not devised; it is only revealed. He changes, to be sure. But by this process he only becomes himself.
How does life accomplish this? It is by means of the symbolically encoded, individuated information sequestered in the genome. It is only by virtue of this encoded genetic information, and its closely regulated expression, that a living thing undergoes any process of biological maturation, or is ever able to reproduce itself. And this — the storage and transmission of individuated symbolic information — is no simple thing. It cannot be. We find that life is not emergent by coincidence; it is emergent of necessity. Development and reproduction have this in common: each requires a strongly emergent becoming machine.
The strongly emergent requirements for information storage, transmission, and reception
What is needed, at a minimum, to store individuated, aperiodic biological information? It cannot be a simple arrangement, because multiple parts are unavoidably necessary. There must be some medium to store the information, and it must be partitioned in some manner to allow multiple bits of information to be stored in a distinguishable and retrievable manner. This medium must be deformable in some manner — that is, capable of denoting at least two distinguishable states. These might be on vs. off in the case of a microchip, or ink vs. paper in the case of written information. In the case of life, it is adenine vs. guanine vs. thymine vs. cytosine. And of course, there must additionally be a message — the actual information that is to be recorded via the medium.
No simple, single part can store information. If even one bit is to be stored, this single part must at least have two ways of being. Information then, of necessity, requires a plurality. And to convey individuated genetic information, a substantial plurality is required. As we have seen, twenty amino acids could not be encoded by four nucleobases taken one at a time, or even two at a time. There is a minimum informational requirement to signify even a single amino acid from among twenty. A protein, of course, is necessarily composed of many amino acids.
There is always some calculable minimum number of parts and states that is mathematically necessary to store any given piece of information. What is more, such a plurality necessarily describes a strongly emergent construct, for it is only by the state and arrangement of the individual parts that the emergent meaning is conveyed. If we reduce a piece of information — say, a telephone number — to its subsidiary parts, the meaning is utterly lost. If we are only told which digits a phone number contains, we have been told nothing useful at all. To make use of the information, we must know their actual sequence. The same is true of any meaningful information: it may only ever be stored in a strongly emergent construct, following elective and willful assignation from a transcendent tier.
The transmission of meaningful information has all the same requirements, and more. Certainly, an additional plurality is required, for there must be a sender as well as a receiver. On the part of the sender, there must be some strongly emergent construct with sufficient capacity to harbor the information to be sent. On the part of the receiver, there must be some strongly emergent construct with sufficient capacity to receive it. Between the two, the information must be modulated into some transmittable format via some available medium, actually transmitted, and then received and demodulated by the receiver. The necessity of a plurality is evident.
The entire affair is plainly emergent: if either the sender or the receiver is absent, communication has not occurred and cannot. And it is strongly emergent. Certainly there is no requirement that any information ever be transmitted at all, and no requirement for any particular message. These decisions are made electively from the transcendent perspective of the sender, and depend upon the prior awareness and agreement of the receiver with regard to syntax. The active sender may be a conscious mind, or alternatively a strongly emergent construct in which the intent of such a mind has been enshrined. But all must begin, ultimately, with willful and elective assignation.
In the case of a living thing, all of these requirements are met by a strongly emergent construct we have considered at some length: the genetic machine. We find that for a living thing to become itself via maturation, or reproduce itself, it must have such a machine. It must be capable of harboring, modulating and transmitting individuated, meaningful information. And since, in the case of life, the receiver will be a reproduction of the sender, a living thing must possess the capacity to receive, demodulate, and store such information as well. Without all this, no living thing could mature to become anything. And without all this, no living thing could produce a lineage. A strongly emergent becoming machine is utterly necessary for generational inheritance.
In all life on earth, the genetic machine serves this emergent purpose. But for all the wonder that it is, the genetic machine, in itself, is not even alive. It is as vast and strongly emergent a construct as we may comfortably imagine, and yet it is still only a subsidiary part of something greater. Let us consider why this is so, and why it must be.
The strongly emergent requirement of energy
As we have seen, life can only exist by virtue of producing, maintaining and transmitting meaningful information. Here, we must recognize that all of these processes necessarily accrue a free energy cost. Energy must always be expended to produce, maintain or transmit meaningful information, because the generation and maintenance of such information increases order, and thereby decreases entropy. Alberts has said it well:
One property of living things above all makes them seem almost miraculously different from nonliving matter: they create and maintain order, in a universe that is tending always to greater disorder.
The universal tendency of things to become disordered is a fundamental law of physics—the second law of thermodynamics—which states that in the universe, or in any isolated system (a collection of matter that is completely isolated from the rest of the universe), the degree of disorder always increases.
As the cell lives and grows, it creates internal order. But it constantly releases heat energy as it synthesizes molecules and assembles them into cell structures.
The cell cannot derive any benefit from the heat energy it releases unless the heat-generating reactions inside the cell are directly linked to the processes that generate molecular order.16
This process of generating energy and linking, or coupling it to the production and maintenance of order within a living thing is broadly referred to as metabolism. As we may readily note from the above, metabolism is not optional. Life cannot be if meaningful information cannot be produced, maintained and transmitted. And none of this can occur without the continuous expenditure of free energy. Metabolic processes serve this purpose. They are necessarily emergent, for as we have seen, a coupling is required. Separate heat-generating reactions must be coupled to the heat-requiring ones that produce and maintain order. Together, these allow the genetic machine to function and life to be.
More could be said regarding the emergent nature of metabolism itself. But beyond all that, it is strongly emergent, of necessity, for another reason entirely: The means of metabolism must be heritable. Metabolism is, itself, a product of the genetic machine. The enzymes that effect metabolism are produced via tightly regulated gene expression. Thus, the mechanisms of metabolism are strongly emergent, and the means of their inheritance is strongly emergent as well.
Without all this, life could not be. But still, we have not described all that is necessary. We have noted that in the case of metabolism, reactions must be coupled. We have reviewed the function of the genetic machine at some length to see how very many subsidiary molecules and whole constructs must be assembled together to accomplish gene expression. We have recognized that all these necessary spatial and temporal relationships are, collectively, constraints. And constraints are indeed required in all these ways, and also in a more broad and overarching manner, for life to be. Let us further consider the matter of constraints.
The strongly emergent requirement of constraints
We have begun to see, while considering these separate matters, that living things are made of molecules. Molecules make up the genetic machine. Molecules effect metabolism. But how is this possible? A molecule cannot “know” what to do. The molecules inside living things accomplish their emergent function by means of interacting with one another. But what process allows this to occur?
The phenomenon responsible is called diffusion. Individual molecules, of course, are mindless and move without purpose. The molecules in living things, by virtue of their assembled structure, have surfaces that match one another with extraordinary specificity. It is by this means that an aminoacyltransferase binds the correct amino acid, ensures its correctness through proofreading, and charges a cognate tRNA with the amino acid. It is by this means that the ribosome determines the correctness of the amino acid before incorporating it into the growing, nascent polypeptide. And it is by this means that protein enzymes facilitate the reactions that drive metabolism. Diffusion is the process that brings these molecules together, giving them the opportunity to recognize one another and accomplish their various emergent functions.
Diffusion is random movement, and it is for this reason that tight constraints must be imposed. When a molecule moves randomly, the average distance it travels is proportional to the square root of the time elapsed. This nonlinear relationship has a profound effect on the efficacy of diffusion as a mechanism. If it takes a molecule 1 second to travel 1 micrometer, it will take 100 seconds to travel 10 micrometers. Molecules must diffuse within tight spatiotemporal constraints or they will not interact with sufficient frequency to effect their emergent function. These constraints are utterly necessary, and are imposed in living things in a most concrete manner by the cell membrane.
The cell membrane must necessarily be emergent, and strongly so. It must obviously be composed of a plurality of molecules itself, as it functions by encapsulating the thousands of subsidiary molecules necessary for gene expression and its empowerment. It must also allow specific molecules into and out of the cell. This is accomplished by active membrane transport proteins that comprise some 50% of the cell membrane. These proteins are themselves strongly emergent constructs, and are products of gene expression that require metabolic energy for their synthesis and for their ongoing function.
We could say much more of the cell membrane. But we have said enough to see that its function is strongly emergent. It additionally shares the requirement of heritability with metabolism and the genetic machine itself. The components of the cell membrane are all products of gene expression. As such, the membrane itself exists only as a consequence of multiple strongly emergent constructs.
The emergent organism
The genetic machine. Metabolism. The cell membrane. Together, these three enable information production, storage, and transmission, free energy utilization, and constrained diffusion. All are necessary for life to be. These functions are present in all living things, and all must be for the reasons we have reviewed. Together, these three describe an overarching, strongly emergent construct: the organism. The emergent organism is the biological agent of becoming. It is the singular, strongly emergent construct — itself composed of vast, interdependent and strongly emergent constructs — by which all living things emerge to become themselves.
Many organisms are made up of but a single cell, and many are made up of more than that. These, of course, are strongly emergent constructs of which each cell is a constrained subsidiary member. But importantly, no living thing is less than a cell. It is the minimum unit of emergent biological function. It is the minimum unit of life. Apart from its assembled, emergent whole, there is no biological becoming. Empirically we do not encounter such. And conceptually, we have established why that is so.
Life has not evolved; it has emerged, and this by virtue of transcendent assignation — the necessary guiding principle for every strongly emergent construct. Life becomes itself, but not by accident. It is a meticulously regulated becoming, and necessarily so, for it does not arise spontaneously from indeterminacy and could not do so. Rather, it is elicited by the imposition of constraints from above — these necessarily informed by emergent purpose from a transcendent ontic tier.
Profound interdependencies
We may briefly consider the profound interdependencies described by the emergent organism. Of these three components — the genetic machine, metabolism, and the cell membrane — no one component is sufficient for life. No one component may exist, or come to be reproduced, without its own presence as well as the presence of the other two. No two components suffice to produce life, nor to produce the third in its absence. From every perspective we might adopt, the emergent whole provides a contextualizing framework that is necessary for life to emerge and become itself.
Have we considered evolution, or only abiogenesis?
Some evolutionists will raise this point. If the emergent organism is necessary for evolution to proceed, they will say, so be it. Evolution has taken it from there. Why is this invalid?
We have considered the emergent organism as a concept. It is a strongly emergent construct, to be sure. But actual living things are more than this. A living thing does not merely live; it lives as something. It may be a microbe, a mouse or a man. Each of these — and all living things — live by means of the genetic machine. All require metabolism. All require a cell membrane. These elements, themselves, do not even confer any advantage, unless we consider life itself an advantaged position with respect to the alternative.
No creature wins a competition by virtue of its superior genetic machine. The same broad, emergent function is present in oak trees and amoebae, in foxes and ferns. The genetic machine itself is phenotypically invisible. Utterly necessary and constant, it has bridged the chasm between genotype and phenotype since life began. It is so profoundly relevant that we will do well to acknowledge it separately, so henceforth we will name its function semiotype. We additionally note that semiotype is inextricably intertwined with genotype and phenotype. None exists, nor can exist, without itself and both the others.
An organism only lives by virtue of these three. To live, it must have a sufficient genotype to produce the whole of semiotype, and phenotype as well. From that time forward, the value of any phenotypic expression is utterly determined by the organism so established. A dandelion will not benefit from teeth. Trout have no need for a thumb. The most treasured and useful traits for any species are a consequence not of the environment, but of its own genome. In the absence of a genome sufficient to produce an emergent organism, no addition would be of benefit and none would accrue. In the presence of a sufficient genome, the creature will proceed only to become itself. That is the way of life.
In closing
When he introduced his long idea, Charles Darwin made this famous observation:
If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down.
The principle of irreducible complexity was thus introduced by Darwin himself as a potential refutation of his theory, should such an entity be demonstrated. Some have offered subsidiary structures — the eye, or the flagellum — as examples. But evolutionists have responded with claims of pre-adaptation: The parts were originally meant for something else, they have said. But here, no such claim may be made. In the absence of the emergent construct of organism, any claim of biological function, purpose or meaning is incoherent. Apart from this strongly emergent construct, effected via transcendent assignation, no biological entity holds any meaning, serves any purpose, accomplishes any function, nor ever could.
Absent the emergent organism, there is no genome that may vary, and nothing even to select. There is no life, no means of becoming and no reason to become. Where there is organismal organization, evolution is needless, for the creature already possesses all it requires to become itself. Each subsidiary part is necessary but no subsidiary part is sufficient; only the emergent whole will do. Thus, the irreducibly complex entity is here found to be the strongly emergent construct of organism.
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